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Institutions and Preferences in Settings of Causal Complexity:  
Foreign Institutional Investors and Corporate Restructuring Practices in France 
Dong Kwan Jung, Ruth Aguilera and Michel Goyer 
Abstract 
In this article, we illustrate how the interaction between institutional arrangements and the 
presence of different categories of firm stakeholders with specific preferences provides 
important insights to understand the conditions under which corporate restructuring practices 
are introduced. Institutions shape the range of actors’ strategic options and mediate the 
translation of the preferences of firm stakeholders into corporate policies. Nonetheless, 
strategic choice remains possible since firm stakeholders constitute sub-groups with different 
interests and incentives that influence how they operate in an institutional framework. In 
particular, we examine under what conditions UK/US-based institutional investors and 
equity-based compensation incentives are associated with the implementation of asset 
divestitures and employee layoffs in France. We uncover three key findings. First, the 
presence of hedge funds and equity-based pay influence the likelihood of French companies 
undertaking asset divestitures. Second, the impact of hedge funds on employee layoffs is 
contingent on the ownership structure of firms. Third, layoffs in France are driven by inferior 
performance – a result that contrasts with the American experience whereby employee 
layoffs are also used as a strategic mechanism to deal with institutional investors in good 
times. Our findings demonstrate the importance of the institutional constraints of (national-
level) employment protection and the moderating effects of ownership structure (firm-level) 
on the strategic and employment policies of French companies.    
 
Keywords: Comparative Corporate Governance, Employment Protection, Employee Layoffs, 
National Institutional Frameworks, Institutional Investors, CEO Compensation, France 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact of corporate governance, and more specifically of ownership, on 
employment relations has received considerable interest in recent years (Black, Gospel & 
Pendleton, 2008; Zagelmeyer, Heckmann & Kettner, 2012). In the United States, for instance, 
increased ownership by institutional investors over the last three decades has transformed the 
nature of employment relations. Creating shareholder value at the expense of other 
stakeholders, especially employees, is increasingly seen as the fundamental purpose of 
corporations (Jacoby, 2005). Drastic corporate restructuring activities, such as employee 
layoffs and asset divestitures, have been prevalent since institutional investors believe that 
these practices are one of the most effective means to maximise shareholder value (Davis, 
2009). Moreover, American companies increasingly rely on employee layoffs, which were 
previously used as temporary labour force reductions caused by decreased product demand, 
in order to improve financial performance in the context of increased pressures from 
shareholder value driven institutional investors (Budros, 2002; Farber & Hallock, 2009).  
In this article, we study the undertaking of two important corporate restructuring 
activities: employee layoffs and asset divestiture. We examine how the “Anglo-American 
influence” has shaped the introduction of corporate restructuring practices in France – an 
economy traditionally not receptive to the concept of shareholder value maximisation 
(Culpepper, 2005; Djelic & Zarlowski, 2005). For this purpose, we identify two channels 
through which the Anglo-American influence can affect corporate restructuring: (1) via block 
share purchases by U.S./U.K.-based institutional investors, and (2) via the adoption of CEO 
equity-based compensation (stock options and restricted shares). We develop and test 
hypotheses concerning their effects, utilising a discrete-time event history analysis of 
corporate restructuring activities with a sample of 130 French non-financial public companies 
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between 1998 and 2007. We also explore whether these effects hold in the current economic 
crisis.  
Our argument highlights how the interaction between institutional arrangements and 
the preferences of different categories of firm stakeholders provides important insights to 
understand the conditions under which corporate restructuring practices are introduced 
(Goyer, 2011; see also Garrett & Lange, 1995). In contrast to previous studies (qualitative 
and quantitative alike) that seek to identify the direct effects of hypothesized independent 
variables as standing-alone explanations, we conceptualize institutions and preferences as 
being part of a phenomenon of complex causation whereby an outcome results from 
potentially different combinations of factors (Hall, 2003; Ragin, 1987). Institutional 
arrangements and firm-level corporate governance practices constitute key factors accounting 
for cross-national differences in trajectories of change (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 
1999). Institutions act as constraints that reduce the range of feasible options by structuring 
power relations inside companies (Campbell, 2004; Hall, 1986). The conversion of the 
preferences of actors, even powerful ones, into corporate policies is mediated by the 
institutional framework in which they are embedded (Garrett & Lange, 1995). Nonetheless, 
institutional arrangements are not specific enough to translate into predictions about the 
strategic behavior of actors. The presence of different interest groups in advanced capitalist 
economies – such as firm stakeholders – each with their own idiosyncratic set of preferences, 
and governed by different internally defined rules, affect how they operate within an 
institutional framework (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). In particular, highly incentivized firm 
stakeholders are often better placed to mitigate the constraining effects of institutions by 
exercising their greater level of discretion in less institutionally constrained arenas (see e.g. 
Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Whittington, 1988).  
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We investigate under what conditions the arrival of shareholder-oriented investors and 
the introduction of new governance instruments are likely to change two important corporate 
restructuring activities, employee layoffs and asset divestiture. We present three insightful 
empirical findings. First, the effect of UK/US-based shareholders on corporate restructuring 
varies contingently on the type of institutional investor and the ownership structure of 
targeted companies. We find that foreign institutional investors, when analysed as one group, 
do not increase the likelihood of a firm initiating restructuring activities. Yet, when 
differentiating by type of foreign investors, we uncover the influence of hedge funds on 
corporate restructuring. The causal influence of hedge funds, however, exhibits significant 
variations between asset divestiture and employee layoffs. For instance, while we find a 
positive and significant association between hedge fund investments and asset divestiture for 
all the sampled firms, the association between hedge funds and employee layoffs is only 
present among firm with diffused ownership. Our findings highlight the importance of the 
diversity of preferences across different categories of institutional investors interacting with 
the presence of significant institutional constraints of employment protection laws (national-
level) as well as of the moderating effects of the ownership structure (firm-level). 
Second, we uncover that French companies governed by CEOs with higher equity-
based compensation are more likely to initiate asset divestitures, while the introduction of this 
UK/US-based financial incentive has a marginally negative association with employee 
layoffs. We consider this result as suggestive, if not strong, evidence that the rigid French 
employment protection laws act as a salient institutional constraint even on financially 
incentivized CEOs.   
Third, our empirical results highlight that French companies undertaking employee 
layoffs experience superior operating performance as compared to those that do not. 
However, we do not find significant performance improvement in the case of asset 
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divestiture. The difference in outcomes between these two corporate restructuring activities 
suggests the presence of heightened institutional constraints, and potential political tensions, 
associated with employee layoffs in France. Our empirical analyses also reveal that poor 
performance constitutes a key driver to employment reduction in France. This result 
demonstrates that the nature of employment reduction in France is distinct from “offensive” 
layoffs more common in the United States in the last three decades. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We first introduce our conceptual 
framework and describe the French empirical context. Second, we discuss the literature of the 
empirical research on the Anglo-American influence (foreign institutional investors and CEO 
stock options) on corporate restructuring activities from which we develop our hypotheses. 
Third, we describe our sample and present the methods used. Fourth, we present our 
empirical results, followed by a discussion and conclusion.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Analytical Perspective 
This study of the influence of Anglo-American institutional investors and new 
governance practices (CEO equity-based compensation) on the corporate restructuring 
activities (asset divestitures and employee layoffs) of French companies raises important 
theoretical issues regarding the generalizability of findings across national settings. Do causal 
relationships in one setting translate faithfully into another one? Our argument builds on an 
extensive, and theoretically insightful, literature in social sciences delineating how 
institutions constitute the outcome of political and social struggles in historically specific 
settings that, in turn, influence the direction and character of change (Elster, 1984; Hall, 
1986). Historically-contingent institutional arrangements, once in place, act as constraints 
that reduce the range of feasible options in an asymmetrical manner (Hall & Soskice, 2011; 
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Whitley, 1999). The presence of institutional diversity across national business systems 
shapes the power of different firm stakeholders by offering disproportionate access to, and 
thus influence over, the decision-making process and its associated resources at hand 
(Campbell, 2004; Hall, 1986). An incorporation of institutional effects is particularly suited 
to the context of French employment relations given the provision of relatively strong legal 
employment protection as measured by the costs of hiring new employees, size of severance 
payments, terms of unfair dismissal, and (lengthy) notice requirements for the initiation of 
dismissal procedures (Botero et al., 2004; OECD, 2004).  
Yet the salience of institutional arrangements, themselves the outcomes of political 
and social struggles, constitutes a too broad category that overstates their constraining 
character. Our argument specifically links the role of institutions with the nature of causation 
in social sciences. Key political, economic, and social outcomes are rarely generated by the 
presence of one cause alone; they occur as the result of specific intersections of conditions 
(Hall, 2003; Ragin, 1987). Although institutions are crucial to understand important changes 
in economic life, they are part of a phenomenon of complex causation whereby an outcome 
results from potentially different combinations of factors. In this article, we identify two 
factors that highlight how the insights associated with the presence of institutional constraints 
are strengthened by an incorporation of the strategic choices of actors in an overall process of 
complexity.  
The first factor, inspired by actor-centered approaches, illustrates the influence of 
different categories of firm stakeholders in the governance of companies (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005). Firm stakeholders are characterized by the 
presence of groups with different interests, and governed by distinct internally defined rules 
that, in turn, shape their preferences. For instance, the preferences of UK/US-based 
shareholder value oriented investors can be divided along their investment strategies, size of 
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equity stake, time horizon, prominence of commitment versus liquidity concerns, and the 
degree of their embedded position in national corporate networks (Brav et al., 2008; Goyer, 
2006). The presence of groups with different interests and preferences suggests that how they 
learn to operate in a single, and constraining, institutional framework, can therefore lead to 
different adjustment paths. 
The second factor emphasizes how processes of institutional creation are often 
characterized by piecemeal diffusion whereby new institutions are introduced in a limited 
number of areas of the economy while other spheres are left untouched (Locke & Thelen, 
1995). In the first four postwar decades, for instance, French policy-makers simultaneously 
sought to stimulate economic growth while minimizing its economic dislocations (Berger, 
1981; Hall, 1986). As a result, organized labor was provided with strong employment 
protection for core workers that, in turn, makes it difficult for employers to pursue strategies 
of external flexibility (OECD, 2004). At the same time, however, French policy-makers also 
sought to exercise strategic influence over large companies that, in turn, led to the non-
introduction of several firm-level institutional arrangements currently found in coordinated 
market economies – such as Germany (Goyer, 2011: 1-50). French policy-makers avoided 
giving extensive legal rights to firm-level works councils that would have acted as constraints 
on managerial autonomy (Zysman, 1977). In other words, the position of legally-based 
strength of organized labor against external restructuring has not been matched by legal 
provisions at the firm-level that would have enabled French employees to serve as partners in 
the strategic direction of the firm -- as in the German case for instance (Maurice, Sellier & 
Silvestre, 1986). 
The above discussion of the importance of causal complexity in the analysis of firm 
governance leads to three key implications for this study. The first one is that the ability of 
different firm stakeholders to secure their favorite outcomes does not take place in an 
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institutional vacuum (Campbell, 2004; Hall, 1986). Firms are embedded in different 
institutional settings across national business systems that, in turn, shape power relations at 
the firm-level (Hall & Thelen, 2009; Whitley, 1999). The second implication suggests that 
actors can exercise more influence over strategic choices in less institutionally/regulatory 
constrained arenas (Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Whittington, 1988). These areas are often 
associated with greater range of possible courses of actions, thereby highlighting how the 
piecemeal introduction of institutions itself reflect how the sources of power of actors are 
implemented in different institutions (Locke & Thelen, 1995). As a result, the translation of 
foreign practices could work more smoothly in less institutionally constrained domains. The 
third implication suggests that the presence of less institutionally/regulatory constrained 
arenas in national economies will be exploited in an asymmetric manner by different 
categories of firm stakeholders who are themselves characterized by different interests and 
governed by different internally defined rules (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).  
 
Anglo-American Institutional Investors and Corporate Restructuring: 
Preferences and Institutional Context 
 
The French economy has long been characterized by the importance of state policies 
on the governance of companies. State officials implemented policies designed to modernize 
the economy from above in order to enable French firms to become “national champions” 
from the late 1940s onward: regulation of the financial sector designed to influence the 
allocation of flows in the economy, instauration of controls over inward/outward flows of 
capital, presence of state ownership in the banking and non-financial sectors, and the periodic 
use of currency devaluations to stimulate the economy (Eichengreen, 2007: 113-118; Hall, 
1986). In contrast, the last two decades have witnessed the withdrawal of the state from many 
areas of economic activities, most notably, although not exclusively, through privatizations of 
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the bulk of the largest state-owned companies, the removal of capital controls, the completion 
of the EU internal market, the deregulation of the financial sector, and adhesion to a common 
European monetary system that is depriving policy-makers of the currency devaluation 
option (Djelic & Zarlowski, 2005; Hancké, 2002).  
The withdrawal of the state from many areas of economic activities and the 
introduction of market friendly policies have also been followed by the emergence of 
shareholder value driven institutional investors from the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The importance of UK/US-based institutional investors in France is first captured 
by the significant increase of their stake in large domestic companies, from 17.4 to 36.1 
percent from 1990 to 2000, a progression superior as compared to other major Continental 
European economies (Goyer 2006: 406). The increased ownership by foreign institutional 
investors in France also comes in the wake of their heightened monitoring and shareholder 
activism in the home market whereby employee layoffs have been used as a strategic option 
by which companies are dealing with shareholder value driven investors, no longer solely as 
a mechanism for managing their workforce (Budros 2002; Farber and Hallock 2009).  
Yet, broad statements about increased foreign ownership in France are not specific 
enough to translate into predictions about their influence over the strategy of portfolio firms. 
The presence of significant differences in the preferences of institutional investors matters for 
their differentiated influence on corporate restructuring activities of companies. Different 
categories of institutional investors – hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds – 
constitute investment organizations that are themselves governed by different institutionally 
defined rules. In particular, they exhibit variation on important characteristics of their internal 
organization: set of incentives (remuneration) of fund managers, investment horizons, and the 
extent to which the investment strategy is driven by performance concerns versus risk 
diversification/reduction of management fees (Brown et al. 2001; Goyer, 2006). Managers of 
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hedge funds are mainly driven by performance goals, not by diversification concerns through 
a long-term index strategy and/or reduction in portfolio management fees. They possess 
heightened incentives to reap the maximum possible absolute returns, not just achieving 
targeted mandated minimum returns. Moreover, the compensation of hedge funds’ managers 
derives from the amount of assets under management (1-2%) and, to a substantial extent, 
from incentive fees (usually 20% of profits). These incentive fees are paid only in the event 
of the returns on the portfolio exceeding pre-established returns. As such, hedge funds 
possess strong incentives to monitor and engage with portfolio companies by acquiring firm-
specific information about the business strategy of corporations (Kahan & Rock, 2007). 
Mutual/pension funds, in contrast, are more likely to focus on different aspects of corporate 
governance practices rather than acquiring detailed and specific knowledge of the business 
strategy of individual portfolio companies. In comparative terms, shareholder activism by 
hedge funds is far more aggressive and aimed at the strategy of companies as compared to 
mutual/pension funds (Brav et al., 2008).  
Reflecting on the presence of heterogeneity among institutional investors 
characterized by different sets of preferences, we split block share purchases into two 
subgroups: hedge funds versus pension funds/mutual funds. We expect that hedge funds 
constitute the category of institutional investors best incentivized to apply pressures on 
management for the implementation of specific corporate restructuring activities (Kahan & 
Rock, 2007). The differentiation between categories of institutional investors is particularly 
important in that corporate restructuring activities are relatively difficult tasks to implement, 
characteristically different from other goals, such as forcing management to distribute more 
dividends. 
At the same time, however, an exclusive focus on the preferences of different groups 
of foreign institutional investors is unlikely to be sufficient to provide a full account of the 
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corporate restructuring activities of French companies since the translation of preference 
inputs into corporate policies is mediated by the embedded institutional context (Campbell, 
2004). An important component of our complex causation perspective suggests that local 
institutional arrangements reduce the range of strategic options for foreign institutional 
investors, even for highly incentivized and motivated actors. We focus our empirical analysis 
on the employment protection laws in France, the regulative pillar of institutional 
arrangements of corporate restructuring (cf. Scott, 2008). Compared to other advanced 
capitalist economies, French employment contract laws are characterized by strict laws and 
regulations against employee dismissals that impede and/or significantly delay downsizing 
strategies via layoffs (Supiot, 2002). Institutional arrangements of employment relations in 
France provide strong legal employee protection by international standards as measured by 
the costs of hiring new employees, size of severance payments, definition of unfair dismissal, 
and (lengthy) notice requirements for the initiation of dismissal procedures (Botero et al., 
2004; OECD, 2004). Moreover, French employees possess extensive legally entitled 
information rights over important areas of corporate decisions that seriously limit the ability 
of French firms to adjust to short-term fluctuations via substantial reductions in the number of 
permanent employees (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2006). In particular, provisions of 
the French labor code stipulate that companies must draw a “social plan” that sets out the 
reinsertion and training measures to be implemented before proceeding to employee layoffs, 
thereby constraining restructuring strategies based on the rapid use of employee dismissals. 
The undertaking of asset divestitures as a part of an overall refocusing strategy on a 
limited number of core units, in contrast, might encounter less institutional resistance than 
employee layoffs. A refocusing strategy can be achieved by selling non-core divisions to 
other companies rather than proceeding to straightforward downsizing in the number of 
employees, thereby generating cash flows that serve to address liquidity problems as well as 
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constituting a strategic alternative in the context of rigid employment laws (Atanassov & 
Kim, 2009). Therefore, as our complex causation perspective suggests, UK/US-based hedge 
funds could compensate for the limits on their discretion in one realm of choice by using their 
greater level of discretion in other arenas characterized by reduced institutional constraints 
(see e.g. Peteraf and Reed 2007; Whittington 1988). The institutional constraints associated 
with the regulation of dismissals in France are likely to shape the characteristics of the 
contextual influence of hedge funds even if the latter is generally considered a far more 
aggressive category of institutional investors with heightened incentives. The above 
discussion suggests the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1. The acquisition of blockholding stakes by hedge funds in French firms 
is likely to lead to the implementation of asset divestiture. 
 
The effectiveness of UK/US-based hedge funds as shareholder value driven 
institutional investors may also be contingent on the ownership structure of targeted 
companies given the typical size of their blockholding acquisitions – more than five percent 
but invariably less than 20 percent of the firm’s outstanding shares. The ability of firms to 
resist the activism of foreign institutional investors is shaped by the stake of controlling 
shareholders (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005). Non-controlling investors are not as well placed 
as insiders in regard to the strategic direction of companies. The circulation of information in 
France is often internal especially in the presence of a controlling owner (see e.g. Clark & 
Wójcik, 2007). The incorporation of the ownership structure of companies in investigating 
the monitoring role of hedge funds is particularly appropriate given the broad range of 
ownership structures in France whereby only one third of listed firms are widely held (Sraer 
& Thesmar, 2007).  
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Moreover, the contingent character of the influence of hedge funds in France is likely 
to reflect another aspect of the ownership structure of domestic companies, namely the legal 
rights of minority shareholders. Foreign investors can play a more effective monitoring role 
in ownership-diffused companies since French corporate law is better suited at protecting the 
rights of minority shareholders from the value destroying actions of managers in ownership 
diffused settings than at dealing with the strategies of controlling owners seeking to capture 
private benefits of control in the context of ownership concentration (Conac, Enriques & 
Gelter, 2007). Fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are strongly enshrined in French corporate 
law and are not hierarchically subordinate to the actions of corporate executives. Directors 
are required to oppose attempts by corporate executives at self-dealing in the spirit of the 
overall equal treatment for all categories of shareholders (Schmidt, 1999). In contrast, the 
main shortcoming of French corporate law is that the enforcement of legal mechanisms 
against controlling shareholders’ self-dealing strategies designed to capture private benefits 
of control are limited in scope, i.e. they are usually limited to cases of bankruptcy (Conac, 
Enriques & Gelter, 2007). French courts have been less active in penalizing large owners in 
conflict-of-interest situations that are not threatening the existence of the company. The 
above discussion leads us to suggest the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2. The ownership concentration of French firms is likely to weaken the 
positive effects of hedge fund investment on French firms’ undertaking employee layoffs. 
 
CEO Pay and Corporate Restructuring 
The undertaking of corporate restructuring activities is often associated with difficult 
decisions and costly efforts. Sanctioning major layoffs could be one of the most important 
decisions CEOs would have to make due to its associated negative political and social 
implications (Roe, 2000). Managers involved in employee layoffs tend to be subject to media 
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criticism and loss of community standing, a non-negligible issue in the close knit of French 
corporate networks. CEOs may be reluctant to implement employee layoffs because of their 
desire for peaceful relations with the workforce (i.e. the “quiet life”) and/or secure private 
benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). 
Moreover, the undertaking of corporate restructuring activities might be also be unsuited to 
the interests of CEOs themselves given the existing literature on executive pay which 
suggests that firm size is the most powerful predictor of compensation (Frydman & Jenter, 
2010).  
The issue of executive compensation constitutes an excellent case that highlights the 
importance of preferences of actor and the role of institutional frameworks in their translation 
into corporate outputs. A large body of empirical studies suggest that equity-based 
compensation provides incentives to help align CEOs’ interests and the equity return 
objectives of minority investors (Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Equity-
based compensation is different from cash pay, such as salaries and bonuses, in that the latter 
rewards CEOs for past efforts (accounting-based) but does not explicitly motivate future 
equity value-enhancing behaviour. Previous studies on American companies have provided 
consistent evidence suggesting that CEO equity-based pay grants an effective internal 
incentive mechanism to induce CEOs to restructure (Dial & Murphy, 1995). French CEOs, 
whose incentives could be closely aligned with those of foreign shareholders via equity-based 
compensation, are more likely to be incentivized to initiate corporate restructuring activities. 
However, as discussed for Hypothesis 1, highly incentivized CEOs are still facing important 
institutional constraints in the areas of employment protection in France. Therefore, we 
expect that equity-based compensation is likely to incentivise CEOs to initiate asset sales, not 
for the undertaking of employee layoffs. 
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Hypothesis 3. CEO equity-based compensation incentives are likely to lead the 
implementation of asset divestiture. 
 
Corporate Restructuring and Firm Performance  
Previous studies explored whether and how foreign blockholders influence corporate 
restructuring activities of domestic companies in economies previously unexposed to 
demands for the maximization of shareholder value (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; 
Culpepper, 2005). These rich empirical studies have often conceptualized employee layoffs 
and asset divestiture as two alternative strategies of shareholder value creation that would 
result in the enhancement of firm performance. However, we suggest that these two 
dimensions of corporate restructuring may have different post-effects consequences on the 
performance of French companies. They might not constitute functionally equivalent 
mechanisms of shareholder value enhancement since the sources of power of actors, and their 
identities, are embedded in different institutions.  
The strength of organized labor in France has been contingent upon the presence of 
national employment protection laws that stand in the way of adjustment strategies based on 
rapid job and investment reallocation (Howell, 1992; OECD, 2004). In contrast to Germany 
and other coordinated market economies, the legal rights of firm-level works councils in 
France are seriously underdeveloped, thereby reflecting the previous importance of state 
activism in the management of the economy whereby policy-makers sought to exercise in an 
unimpeded manner strategic influence over the behavior of top corporate executives (Hall, 
1986; Zysman, 1977). In particular, the weak position of works councils in France has 
reduced the ability of employees to influence managerial decisions over the development of 
skills (Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986). French employees are likely to be particularly 
concerned about the consequences of reorganization schemes on job security.   
16 
 
The implementation of asset divestitures schemes, on the other hand, might prove 
politically easier for French corporate executives. Asset divestitures are characterized by a 
Janus-face character, i.e. they could be implemented as part of a refocusing strategy on a 
limited number of core activities or, alternatively, could serve as a mechanism to generate 
cash flows to distribute to protect current employees. The financial consequences of asset 
divestitures schemes as a strategy of shareholder value enhancement vary across countries 
according to the relative legal protection of labour vis-à-vis shareholders (Atanassov & Kim, 
2009): in flexible labor markets characterized by weaker legal protection for employees, the 
implementation of asset restructuring schemes are consistently associated with superior 
financial performance; in rigid labor markets characterized by stronger legal protection for 
employees, by contrast, the relationship between asset divestiture and financial performance 
is ambiguous and inconsistent. The reason is that, under the latter institutional scenario, major 
asset sales are often implemented in order to adjust to economic fluctuations or generate cash 
flows to address liquidity problems. Strategies of employment reduction are difficult to 
implement, even if employment reduction might be more economically efficient, in settings 
characterized by strong legal protection for employees (Botero et al., 2004). If, in the context 
of strong employment protection, asset divestitures programs serve to protect employee 
welfare by minimizing employee layoffs, one would not expect strong performance 
improvement after the implementation of asset divestiture as compared to employee layoffs 
schemes. The above discussion suggests the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of employee layoffs on operating performance improvement 
is likely to be stronger than the effect of asset divestiture on operating performance 
improvement in the French context. 
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METHODS 
Data and Sample 
Our sample consists of companies in the Paris Stock Exchange SBF120 between 1998 
and 2007. Historical information on the member of the SBF120 index was used in order to 
avoid self-selection issues. Consequently, our sample includes firms founded later than 1998 
and companies that cease to exist sometime before 2007. Some studies on corporate 
restructuring focus solely on poorly performing firms because they seek to analyze acute 
stakeholder conflicts when the size of the firm shrinks (Atanassov & Kim, 2009). We do not 
restrict our sample to poorly performing firms because the effect of performance on the 
propensity of a firm’s undertaking corporate restructuring is also our concern. We also 
dropped 22 financial firms from our sample as their financial statements are not readily 
comparable with those of industrial firms. Finally, 21 companies were additionally excluded 
due to several reasons, such as being foreign subsidiaries (12), being listed for less than two 
years (5), and missing data (4). Our final sample includes 130 French companies. 
Our observation period begins in 1999 and ends in 2008.  The selection of 1999 as the 
beginning of the observation period reflects the absence of UK and US-based hedge/mutual 
funds in France prior to the late 1990s (Goyer, 2011: 51-83). The closing date of 2008 was 
selected in order to focus on the challenge generated by the pressures of shareholder value in 
France on the governance of domestic companies. An analysis of the corporate restructuring 
activities of French companies prior to the advent of financial crisis is insightful regarding the 
path dependent character of institutional constraints. The institutional arrangements of 
employment relations in France, and in other non-liberal market economies, have often been 
presented as a source of rigidities that prevent companies to adapt quickly to market changes 
(Siebert, 1997). When examined over the longer-term, however, the path dependent character 
of institutional constraints might result in the sustainability of commitments and other 
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mechanisms of competitive advantage. These forces might be washed out by short-term 
pressures (Clark & Wójcik, 2007: 103-129: Hall & Thelen, 2009: 22-26).  We also conducted 
some additional analyses for the current economic crisis in order to explore the contextual 
dimensions of the causal influence of our hypothesized independent variables.  
Data on CEO compensation and tenure, ownership structure, and board composition 
were hand-collected from the annual reports of companies and supplemented by the 
Dafsaliens and Factiva databases. We collected data on foreign investment entries from the 
French Financial Supervisory Authority (AMF). Compliance with Section L233-7 of the 
French Commercial Code requires any institutional investor or person has to report 
shareholding to the AMF and whether the acquired equity stake exceeds or falls below certain 
threshold values. The AMF and the issuing firm then publicise this information which 
contains: the underlying ownership stake, the date of the transaction, the identity of 
shareholders, their location of incorporation and the fraction of shares held after the purchase. 
Other data, such as stock price and accounting information including the number of 
employee, and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes were obtained from Datastream, 
and asset divestiture data from Thomson One Banker. 
 
Measures 
This section describes all our variables and how they are measured. All independent and 
control variables were lagged by one year relative to dependent variables. 
Dependent variables. We define asset divestiture as the sale of a subsidiary by the 
parent firm to another firm with a value of at least US$10 million. We assigned the value of 
one if such transaction occurred at least once in a firm during a given year and zero 
otherwise. We chose a US$10 million minimum to ensure that only significant divestitures 
are included in our sample—it is slightly larger than in some other studies on corporate 
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restructuring of European firms (Chikh & Filbien, 2011). We identified 171 divestitures 
between 1999 and 2008, and the time series variation in the number of asset divestiture is 
large. The annual number of asset divestitures ranges from as low as 14 cases in 1999 to as 
high as 22 in 2005.1 
Employee layoffs is a dichotomous variable equal to one when the number of 
employees of a firm decreased by 5 percent or more between year t and year t-1. Five percent 
represents substantial layoffs, which can be separated from a random fluctuation or gradual 
adjustment in employment level (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005). As a robustness check, we 
perform several tests using both, a discrete variable with the 10 percent threshold and a 
continuous variable (i.e., percent change in employment). The results remain qualitatively 
consistent (results available upon request).  
Independent variables. Given the heterogeneity among institutional investors, we 
focus on hedge funds’ activities and code hedge fund investment as one if there is a block 
share purchase by a hedge fund at the fiscal year-end and zero otherwise. Building on 
previous studies, we define blockholding investments by UK/US-based hedge funds as the 
acquisition of an equity stake of at least five percent in a publicly listed company (Brav et al., 
2008). We excluded equity stakes which remain in the portfolio firms for less than one month 
because those shareholdings can be related to other activities, such as short selling.   
As for compensation incentives, we draw on previous studies (Brookman et al., 2007) 
by seeking to understand the effect of CEO equity-based compensation with the use of fair 
value of the compensation. We consider not only newly granted stock options during the 
current year but also those granted in previous years to better capture CEO incentives 
(hereinafter CEO equity-based incentives). As emphasized by Yermack (1995), one cannot 
                                                          
1 We also used an alternative measure for asset divestiture equal to one when total assets of a firm is reduced by 
5 percent or more while there is no 5 percent or more decrease in the number of employees in the same year. 
The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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determine whether an executive has an appropriate level of incentives by only examining 
newly granted equity-based compensation. CEO equity-based incentives are defined as the 
change in the amount of CEO wealth (thousands) from a 1% change in stock price of the firm 
(Core & Guay, 1999). It is the sum of delta of each option times the number of the stock 
options in the CEO option portfolio. The delta of stock options is measured using the Black 
and Scholes option pricing model adjusted for dividends (Merton, 1973).  
In order to ensure that our results are robust to the alternative measure of incentive 
compensation, we used two other incentive measures considering only newly granted stock 
options in a given year. The first one, similar to the measure above (equity-based incentives), 
captures the euro changes (in thousands) in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price (Core 
& Guay, 1999); and the second one is the euro change in CEO wealth for a euro change in 
firm value (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995). The results are virtually the same as 
those presented in this article, and the significance level is even higher in some tests (results 
are available upon request). 
Ownership concentration is measured as the portion of stakes held by the largest 
shareholder (excluding UK/US institutional investors) of a firm’s outstanding shares. 
Control variables. Building on previous studies, we include a set of control variables 
that are likely to affect the undertaking of corporate restructuring activities: CEO tenure, the 
number of years served in his/her quality of CEO in the firm; percentage of independent 
director defined as those not sitting on the management committee; firm size measured as the 
log of total assets; and leverage ratio coded as short and long-term debts over total assets. 
These indicators of corporate governance were important in the introduction of the interests 
of shareholders in the strategic direction of companies in the American context, invariably at 
the expense of employee (Jacoby, 2005). We also consider block share purchases by other 
than hedge funds, such as UK/US-based pension funds and mutual funds, and define other 
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foreign investors as one if such funds hold 5% or more in the firm at the fiscal year-end. We 
control for cross-listings in US stock exchange markets because listing in a prestigious 
institutional environment is often regarded as conduit for institutional contagion (Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007). Three measures of firm performance are included as managers are under 
heightened pressure from shareholders to initiate portfolio restructuring if expected cash 
flows are reduced: ROA (return on assets) defined as profits before taxes and extraordinary 
items divided by total assets; sales growth measured as the percentage growth in sales 
between year t-1 and year t; and stock performance defined as the one-year holding-period 
return for the company’s common shares over the calendar year before the restructuring 
event. Strategically unfocused firms might be under stronger pressure to undertake either 
asset divestitures and/or employee layoffs given that diversification strategies have been 
increasingly seen as inefficient (Berger & Ofek, 1995). We use two proxies for the level of 
diversification: the number of segments reported by management; and a revenue-based 
Herfindahl index. Finally, we control for possible industry differences and year differences 
by including industry and year fixed effects.  
Analysis 
We used discrete-time event history methodology (Allison, 1984), using logit models of 
dichotomous outcomes to estimate the hazard of a firm initiating corporate restructuring in a 
given year for a pooled sample of each firm observed during each of the ten years studied. 
Pooling data allows us to take advantage of the greater degree of freedom and to capture 
dynamic information of time series and the variation due to cross-sections. All variables were 
updated annually, resulting in annual spells with time-varying covariates except some time-
invariant variables, such as cross-listing and industry dummy. Because corporate 
restructuring activities were repeated events and different odds of a firm initiating 
restructuring practices may be attributable to a lack of independence of observation and/or 
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unobserved firm-specific factors, coefficient estimates could be incorrect. That is, 
observations on the same company in different years create serial correlation in the error 
term, deflate standard errors and, therefore, inflate t-statistics. Thus, we estimate panel robust 
standard errors using the cluster option in Stata.  
As a robustness check, we used a random-effects logit model which yielded virtually 
identical results to those presented in this study. However, we were unable to use fixed-
effects regression models because a large percentage of firms in the sample never initiated 
any of corporate governance activities during the study period, and these firms would be 
dropped in a fixed-effect procedure.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables used 
all periods. Figure 1 shows rates of employee layoffs over time and Figure 2 shows rates of 
asset divestiture. As for foreign blockholdings, there were 152 incidences out of 1061 where 
foreign institutional investors owned 5 percent or more equity stakes in French companies. 
Among the 130 firms in our sample, there are 72 companies which were at least targeted one 
time by UK/US-based institutional investors between 1998 and 2007. The sample is 
heterogeneous enough to allow the comparison of non-targeted companies to targeted 
companies by foreign investors. Mean (median) equity-based incentives indicate the amount 
of CEOs wealth from a 1% change in their firm stock price is, on average, €63,487 (€2,035), 
that is, $87,207 ($2,795). 2  Other US studies using the same measure for equity-based 
incentives report mean (median) of CEO equity-based incentives of their sample firms of 
$558,000 ($117,000) (Core & Guay, 1999) and $1,036,600 ($265,500) (Shin, 2008).  
 
                                                          
2 The 2007 annual average dollar-euro exchange rate was applied, i.e. 1 dollar = 0.728 euro.  
23 
 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of the tests for our hypotheses regarding asset divestiture and 
employee layoffs, respectively. Model 1 of each Table includes only control variables, while 
in models 2 through 4, we introduce the predicted effects to test our hypotheses. Model 5 
presents the full model with all independent and control variables. To compare results from 
asset divestiture and from employee layoffs, we included the predicted effects in Table 3 in 
the similar fashion to Table 2.  
Hypothesis 1 suggested that hedge fund investments have positive effects only on 
asset divestiture due to the rigid legal employment protection in France. Evidence in model 2 
and model 3 (Table 2) provides support for this hypothesis (consistent with H1, p-value < 
0.037). As can be seen in model 1, other foreign investors do not have significant effects on 
asset divestiture. These results suggest the importance of heightened activism by hedge funds 
as compared to other foreign institutional investors.  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
As for employee layoffs, we hypothesised that the effect of hedge fund investment may be 
conditional on the ownership structure of their portfolio firms (Hypothesis 2). The reason is 
that the negotiation power of hedge funds is reduced in the presence of a controlling 
shareholder. As shown in model 2 of Table 3, hedge funds do not have significant effects on 
employee layoffs without considering the degree of firm ownership concentration, which may 
suggest that the strong employment protection in France imposes stringent institutional 
constraints on employee dismissals. Model 3 of Table 3, however, highlights that the 
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interaction term is negative and significant (consistent with H2, p-value < 0.039), and the 
main effect of hedge fund investment is significantly positive in the presence of the 
interaction term (p-value < 0.043). The interaction between them is graphically shown in 
Figure 3, holding other variables at their means. This result demonstrates that the effect of 
hedge funds on the propensity of French firms initiating employee layoffs is stronger in firms 
with more diffused ownership structure. Combining the results of hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
suggest that hedge fund investment is positively associated with asset divestiture for all 
sampled firms, whereas the effect of hedge funds on layoffs varies contingent on ownership 
concentration. Our findings highlight the importance of institutional constraints of 
employment protection laws (national-level) as well as of moderating effects of ownership 
structure (firm-level) on the employment decisions of French companies. In unreported 
analyses, we examined the effect of other foreign investors on layoffs and did not find any 
significant association between them even when considering the ownership structure of 
targeted firms.  
In model 4 of Table 2, we examine the effect of equity-based incentives on asset 
divestiture (hypothesis 3). The empirical results suggest that CEO equity-based incentives are 
positively related to the incidence of asset divestiture (consistent with H3, p-value <0.046). 
For the purpose of comparative analysis, model 4 of Table 3 examines whether equity-based 
incentives influences the likelihood of a firm undertaking employee layoffs. Surprisingly, the 
result indicates that equity-based incentives have marginally significant but negative 
association with layoffs (p-value < 0.075). This result appears to be counter-intuitive because 
it stands in contrast to the idea that stock-based compensation incentivises CEOs to proceed 
to employee layoffs in order to maximise shareholder value. We consider this result as 
suggestive, if not strong, evidence that the French employment protection law constrain even 
financially incentivized top executives.  
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The comparison of the control variables’ effects on employee layoffs and asset 
divestiture illustrates interesting features of corporate restructuring activities. As for capital 
structure, the effect of leverage ratio is positive and significant on the incidence of layoffs, 
but not on the case of asset divestiture. It indicates that the increased threat of bankruptcy 
makes it easier to extract concessions from employees. With respect to firm performance, our 
findings show that poorly-performing firms, measured by ROA and sales growth, are more 
likely to engage in employment reductions while there is no significant association between 
performance and asset divestiture. Many existing studies focusing on the United States 
highlight the changed nature of workforce reduction - from defensive to offensive (Budros, 
1999). That is to say that even a firm which already enjoys strong profits engages in 
workforce downsizing. Our results, however, tell a different story, that poor performance may 
be still necessary for substantial employment reduction to occur in France.  
Short tenured CEOs are more likely to engage in layoffs across all models of Table 3 
whereas we do not find such association for asset divestiture. This evidence suggests that 
CEOs’ long relationship with workers deters the undertaking of employee dismissals 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). In addition, all models in Table 2 indicate that the degree 
of diversification was significantly and positively associated with the incidence of asset 
divestiture, uncovering that French firms are more likely to sell their assets to get their 
business segments consolidated and thus focus on core competencies. Firm size has a 
significantly positive effect on asset divestiture, but not on employment reduction. This result 
shows that large firms consisting of many business parts are more likely to sell assets during 
financial distress due to more flexibility in deciding which assets to sell. Finally, the 
coefficient on ADRs is not significantly different from zero, indicating weak spillover effect 
from cross-listing on the U.S. stock markets. 
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We now turn to hypothesis 4 where we argue that French firms undertaking employee 
layoffs exhibit improvement of operating performance relative to those without layoffs; and 
that French firms engaging in asset divestiture do not show performance improvement as 
compared to those without asset divestiture. In Table 4 we show the post-effect of each 
corporate restructuring practice on operating performance (ROA) in the post-restructuring 
period (year +1 and year +2). We used event study methodology with a new dependent 
variable, namely change in operating performance. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), we 
measured change in the operating performance of firms by comparing operating performance 
in the restructuring year (year 0), and those in year +1 and year +2, respectively. In Table 4, 
‘no downsizing firms’ are firms not undertaking employee layoffs (see rows with Panels A 
and B) and asset divestiture (Panel C and D) in year 0, respectively while ‘downsizing firms’ 
are their respective counterparts. The t-statistic tests are used for mean differences between 
sub-groups, and the Z-statistic tests from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used for median 
differences (median values in brackets). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Panels A and C report that firms engaging in either employee layoffs or asset 
divestiture underperform their counterparts respectively in the year 0, +1, and +2, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 0.1% significant level (p-value< 0.001). Panels B 
and D suggest that the change in ROA varies according to the type of restructuring activities: 
when firms cut jobs, they experience a significant improvement in ROA in year +2 relative to 
their counterparts. The improvements in performance are statistically significant, and the 
mean (median) cumulative increase in firms cutting jobs over two years is 0.012 (0.003), 
which represents an increase of 12.2% (3.16%) in ROA in year 2. We, however, do not find 
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the performance improvement when firms engage in asset divestiture. When comparing the 
median ROA, operating performance of firms selling their assets is slightly better than their 
counterparts in each of post-restructuring periods. The mean (median) cumulative increase of 
restructured firms is not significantly different from their counterparts. The overall results 
thus provide insightful evidence to support hypothesis 4. 
Finally, we conducted additional tests to uncover the potential effect of the banking 
and sovereign debt crisis of 2008-2011 on corporate restructuring activities (see tables 5 and 
6). The French economy has been particularly hit as a result of massive losses in the financial 
sector and overall low economic growth (Goyer and Valdivielso del Real, 2014: 804-806). 
We seek to explore whether the financial crisis affected the uncovered relations between 
corporate governance and corporate restructuring. Our analyses yield three insightful results. 
First, the hedge fund acquisition of blockholding stakes in French companies ceased to 
influence both indicators (asset divestitures and employee layoffs) of corporate restructuring 
(see Tables 5 and 6). This is largely explained by their substantial shrinkage with the advent 
of the banking/financial crisis, accompanied with their substantial losses (Ben-David, 
Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2012). For the specific case of France, we encountered only seven 
instances of UK/US-based hedge funds acquiring an investment stake of five percent or more 
in listed companies in this period.  
A second insightful empirical result, on the other hand, shows that the effect of CEO 
equity-based compensation on restructuring activities remains intact during the crisis period: 
CEO incentive pay increases the likelihood of French companies undertaking asset 
divestitures, but has no significant effect on employee layoffs, which corresponds to our 
findings for the pre-crisis period (see Tables 5 and 6). It corroborates that irrespective of the 
macroeconomic context, French employment protection law constrains financially 
incentivized top executives in the undertaking of employee layoffs. In contrast, CEO equity-
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based pay does provide sufficient incentives on French executives to implement asset 
divestiture policies. 
The third empirical result reveals that poor performance is still necessary for French 
companies to undertake employee layoffs even in the post-crisis period, which suggests the 
continuing salience of the institutional constraint of strong employment protection in France 
(see Table 6). It also highlights the importance of institutional differences among national 
business systems as illustrated by the American experience where employee layoffs are also 
used in good times as a strategic option to deal with shareholder-value driven institutional 
investors (Jacoby, 2005).   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Analyses in social sciences are often framed as a paradigm war between different theoretical 
perspectives. Scholars seek to demonstrate the explanatory power of their ‘selected’ 
independent variable by measuring its direct effects on outcomes. The results are often 
disappointing as these studies focusing on single explanations invariably fail to capture the 
presence of strategic interaction in processes of causal complexity. In qualitative studies, 
researchers seek to demonstrate the explanatory power of their independent variable by 
holding other factors constant. By holding institutions/preferences constant, scholars aim to 
highlight how changing preferences/institutions produces different values on the dependent 
variable. The challenge is that the causal influence of a hypothesized causal independent 
variable is contingent upon the specific context of causal complexity causal in which it is 
embedded (Gourevitch, 1999; Mahoney, 2008).  
In quantitative studies, the use of regression techniques is often designed to identify 
the average effect of the ‘selected’ independent variable across a large number of 
observations. The aim is to uncover the independent variable with the highest predictive 
power as compared to other (competing) hypothesized variables. The results of these large N 
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studies have also been disappointing – particularly in the area of employment relations. For 
instance, the impressive number of empirical studies of employee downsizing in the United 
States are characterized by the overall lack of consistent results that, in turn, reflects the 
limited focus of the bulk of these empirical investigations on the direct effects of 
hypothesized independent variables (see Datta et al., 2010 and Dencker, 2012 for critical 
overviews). In other words, the vast majority of these empirical analyses have failed to 
incorporate the moderating effects of contextual factors in understanding their influence on 
the dependent variable. This shortcoming is not only methodological, but also reflects 
important assumptions about the nature of causation in social sciences (Hall, 2003). The 
insights of moderating variables do not simply consist in producing consistent (and 
statistically significant) results, but also incorporate the notion of causal complexity. 
The main theoretical contribution of our study is to demonstrate that the influence of 
UK/US-based institutional investors and CEO equity-based compensation on the corporate 
restructuring activities of French firms is contingent on how institutions and actor preferences 
interact to generate an outcome that would be substantially different without their joint 
presence. The first component of our complex causation perspective highlights the 
constraining role of institutions on the strategic behaviour of actors and how the translation of 
stakeholder preferences, even for powerful and motivated actors, into corporate outputs is 
contingent on the embedded institutional context. The second component of our complex 
causation perspective illustrates how the presence of groups with different interests and 
governed by different internally defined rules affect their strategic decisions under stable 
institutional arrangements.  
Our empirical study presents a more nuanced account of the influence of UK/US-
based institutional investors and imported strategic practices (CEO equity-based 
compensation) at two levels. First, our empirical findings suggest that the presence of 
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variations in the interests and preferences of Anglo-American institutional investors brings 
key insights to the investigation of corporate restructuring in France. While the investment 
allocation of foreign investors when analyzed as an aggregate group was not significantly 
associated with restructuring activities, we uncover that hedge fund investment is significant 
and positively associated. Even after controlling for firm performance, financial condition, 
and diversification status, corporate restructuring activities in France are more likely to occur 
in the presence of UK/US-based hedge funds as blockholders. Different categories of 
institutional investors encompass core variations regarding their incentive structures, time 
horizons, and investment goals. In other words, strategic choices of actors do not derive 
mechanistically from an institutional framework. The opportunities provided by market 
liberalizing moves in the French economy have not been “seized” equally by foreign funds. 
Preferences do matter.  
Nonetheless, the effects associated with hedge fund investments on corporate 
restructuring vary across the type of restructuring practices as well as the ownership structure 
of targeted firms. The investments of hedge funds have a positive impact on asset divestiture, 
whereas their effects on employee layoffs are positive and significant only in the case of 
companies with diffused ownership. We suggest this asymmetric influence of foreign actors 
on corporate restructuring in France highlights the importance of institutional constraints 
associated with rigid labor laws on employee dismissals. The presence of an institutional 
setting characterized by strong employment protection reduces the ability of highly 
incentivized hedge funds to force firms to undertake employee layoffs. The capacities of 
actors for strategic choice are important but not without limits since the translation of their 
preferences into corporate actions are mediated by the presence of institutional constraints in 
the area of employment relations. Institutions do matter.  
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The constraining character of institutions is also observed in regard to the nature of 
French layoffs as compared to the United States. The literature on employee dismissals has 
extensively documented the changed nature of workforce downsizing - from defensive to 
offensive - in the United States since the 1980s (Budros, 1999). Employee layoffs are 
increasingly used as a tool for earnings management (managing investor pressure and 
boosting stock price). Our empirical results, however, indicate that poor firm performance in 
France is significantly associated with the incidence of employee layoffs. Not only stock 
performance but also operating performance has a strong negative effect on the propensity of 
employee dismissals. Moreover, the demand side, as measured by sales growth, is also a 
significant predictor for layoff decisions. Institutions do matter.  
Second, our empirical evidence suggests that CEO equity-based compensation may 
work in France as an incentive mechanism as prescribed in the Unites States, but in a 
circumscribed institutional context. CEO stock option incentives are effective in incentivizing 
French CEOs to initiate asset divestitures, but not enough for them to induce layoffs due to 
presence of institutional constraints French employment law. In other words, CEO equity-
based compensation has been used to implement corporate restructuring in less institutional 
areas. Institutions and preferences do matter.  
To conclude, we think that our theoretical framework and empirical findings help us 
move beyond often sterile methodological debates between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. The interaction between institutional arrangements and actors’ preferences 
highlights a unique conceptualization of causation in social sciences, namely complexity of 
processes.  
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Figure 1 
Percentage of French Firms Engaging in Employee Layoffs, 1999-2008 
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Figure 2 
Percentage of French Firms Engaging in Asset Divestiture, 1999-2008 
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Figure 3 
Interaction between Hedge Fund Investment and Ownership Concentration, Employee 
Layoffs 
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Table 1 Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Descriptive Statisticsa 
 
  Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Asset divestiture 0.147 0.355 1.000 
      2. Employee layoffs 0.146 0.353 0.101 1.000 
     3. Other foreign investors 0.143 0.351 0.023 0.049 1.000 
    4. Hedge fund investment 0.027 0.163 -0.002 0.051 0.410 1.000 
   5. CEO equity incentives (thousands) 63.487 142.684 0.208 -0.071 -0.030 -0.057 1.000 
  6. American deposit receipt 0.264 0.441 0.242 0.104 0.057 -0.027 0.211 1.000 
 7. Ownership concentration 32.355 21.977 -0.246 -0.096 -0.177 -0.020 -0.154 -0.265 1.000 
8. CEO tenure 8.515 8.409 -0.072 -0.110 -0.073 -0.041 0.041 -0.131 0.017 
9. Diversification 0.513 0.237 -0.203 -0.113 -0.001 0.070 0.055 -0.076 0.072 
10. ROA 0.142 0.105 -0.153 -0.221 -0.124 -0.049 0.026 -0.145 0.227 
11. Sales growth 16.248 31.617 -0.114 -0.150 -0.034 -0.058 -0.088 -0.080 0.031 
12. Stock performance 15.444 48.930 -0.068 -0.176 0.029 -0.015 0.014 -0.053 0.075 
13. Leverage ratio 0.256 0.158 0.051 0.095 0.012 -0.009 0.006 0.018 -0.086 
14. Independent directors 0.220 0.158 -0.106 -0.024 0.003 0.012 -0.137 -0.193 0.127 
15. Log (total assets) 7.798 1.907 0.406 0.077 -0.024 -0.098 0.380 0.381 -0.229 
  Variable   8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
8. CEO tenure 
 
1.000 
       9. Diversification 
 
0.089 1.000 
      10. ROA 
 
0.077 0.077 1.000 
     11. Sales growth 
 
0.053 0.117 0.236 1.000 
    12. Stock performance 
 
0.048 0.036 0.282 0.175 1.000 
   13. Leverage ratio 
 
-0.026 0.021 -0.184 -0.041 -0.060 1.000 
  14. Independent directors 
 
0.222 0.088 0.126 0.158 0.023 -0.020 1.000 
 15. Log (total assets)  -0.198 -0.153 -0.256 -0.271 -0.110 0.174 -0.361 1.000 
        a n = 720. Pearson Correlations greater than 0.067 are significant at .05 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 2 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Asset Divestiture, 1999-2008 
This table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of a firm undertaking asset divestiture. All data are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The robust standard error was estimated using the cluster option in 
STATA. All covariates are lagged by one year. Industry and year dummies were included in all models.  
            
  
Dependent variable: Asset Divestiture 
 
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
  Baseline H1 H1 H3 Full Model 
      
Hedge fund investment (H1) 
 
1.613* 1.423+ 
 
1.428+ 
  
(0.774) (0.827) 
 
(0.797) 
CEO equity-based incentives (H3) 
   
0.001* 0.001* 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Ownership concentration -0.024** 
 
-0.024** -0.023** -0.023** 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Other foreign investors -0.022 0.229 0.027 -0.032 0.021 
 
(0.294) (0.283) (0.293) (0.286) (0.285) 
American deposit receipt -0.000 0.191 -0.002 -0.068 -0.076 
 
(0.326) (0.338) (0.328) (0.314) (0.314) 
CEO tenure 0.014 0.021 0.016 0.006 0.008 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
Diversification -2.310** -2.431** -2.370** -2.296** -2.368** 
 
(0.789) (0.780) (0.760) (0.811) (0.782) 
ROA -3.662 -2.834 -3.484 -4.183+ -4.012+ 
 
(2.264) (2.341) (2.308) (2.290) (2.331) 
Sales growth -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Stock performance -0.006 -0.007+ -0.006 -0.006 -0.007+ 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage ratio -0.246 -0.021 -0.147 -0.130 -0.033 
 
(1.001) (1.099) (1.011) (1.038) (1.044) 
Independent directors -2.022+ -1.399 -2.030+ -1.990+ -1.990+ 
 
(1.047) (1.064) (1.064) (1.093) (1.109) 
Log (total assets) 0.800** 0.899** 0.829** 0.740** 0.768** 
 
(0.117) (0.125) (0.115) (0.122) (0.120) 
Constant -5.122** -7.364** -5.574** -4.680** -5.140** 
 
(1.643) (1.555) (1.557) (1.675) (1.592) 
      
Log-likelihood -290.3 -297.7 -288.6 -287.4 -285.6 
No. firm-year observations 904 904 904 863 863 
No. firms 122 122 122 114 114 
      
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1     
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Table 3 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Employee Layoffs, 1999-2008 
This table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of a firm undertaking employee layoffs. All data 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The robust standard error was estimated using the cluster option in 
STATA. All covariates are lagged by one year. Industry and year dummies were included in all models. 
            
  
Dependent variable:  Asset Divestiture 
 
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
  Baseline   H2   Full Model 
            
Hedge fund investment (H1) 
 
0.714 1.627* 
 
1.648+ 
  
(0.588) (0.804) 
 
(0.848) 
Hedge fund investment  
  
-0.036* 
 
-0.040* 
    x Ownership concentration (H2) 
  
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
      
CEO equity-based incentives 
   
-0.002+ -0.002+ 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Ownership concentration -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Other foreign investors -0.092 -0.055 -0.036 -0.079 -0.019 
 
(0.284) (0.277) (0.278) (0.280) (0.272) 
American deposit receipt 0.183 0.177 0.166 0.190 0.169 
 
(0.294) (0.294) (0.296) (0.298) (0.302) 
CEO tenure -0.035* -0.034* -0.035* -0.037** -0.037** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Diversification -1.244+ -1.272* -1.262+ -1.022 -1.039 
 
(0.657) (0.648) (0.648) (0.650) (0.642) 
ROA -6.743** -6.681** -6.666** -6.311** -6.211** 
 
(1.655) (1.673) (1.680) (1.784) (1.815) 
Sales growth -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.017* -0.017* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Stock performance -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.013** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage ratio 2.326* 2.347* 2.501** 2.790** 3.025** 
 
(0.912) (0.918) (0.926) (0.926) (0.939) 
Independent directors -0.640 -0.662 -0.717 -0.497 -0.537 
 
(0.791) (0.793) (0.797) (0.852) (0.859) 
Log (total assets) -0.113 -0.099 -0.094 -0.061 -0.042 
 
(0.072) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.079) 
Constant 0.078 -0.168 -0.189 -0.705 -1.013 
 
(1.359) (1.282) (1.311) (1.399) (1.379) 
      
Log-likelihood -332.8 -332.0 -330.7 -319.4 -317.2 
No. firm-year observations 902 902 902 861 861 
No. firms 122 122 122 114 114 
      
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 4 Univariate analysis for no downsizing versus downsizing firms: post-downsizing period 
This table reports the difference in changes in corporate performance (ROA) between non-downsizing and 
downsizing firms. Value in bracket is median.  
 
Variable 
No downsizing 
firms 
Downsizing  
firms 
Difference p-value 
Panel A: Operating performance (ROA) after employee layoffs 
 
Year 0 0.152 0.087 0.065*** 0.000 
 
[0.132] [0.091] [0.041]*** [0.000] 
Year +1 0.148 0.086 0.062*** 0.000 
 
[0.128] [0.089] [0.039]*** [0.000] 
Year +2 0.136 0.098 0.039*** 0.000 
 
[0.121] [0.095] [0.026]*** [0.000] 
     
Panel B: Change in ROA over year after employee layoffs 
 
from year 0 to +1 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.645 
 
[-0.001] [-0.003] [0.002] [0.880] 
from year 0 to +2 -0.013 0.015 -0.027*** 0.000 
 
[-0.005] [0.01] [-0.015]*** [0.000] 
Cumulative -0.016 0.012 -0.028** 0.001 
 
[-0.008] [0.003] [-0.011]** [0.004] 
     
Panel C: Operating performance (ROA) after asset divestiture 
 
Year 0 0.149 0.105 0.045*** 0.000 
 
[0.133] [0.107] [0.027]*** [0.000] 
Year +1 0.145 0.102 0.043*** 0.000 
 
[0.129] [0.105] [0.024]*** [0.000] 
Year +2 0.136 0.099 0.037*** 0.000 
 
[0.122] [0.103] [0.020]*** [0.000] 
     
Panel D: Change in ROA over year after asset divestiture 
 
from year 0 to +1 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.770 
 
[-0.002] [0.003] [-0.005]† [0.067] 
from year 0 to +2 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 0.413 
 
[-0.004] [0.000] [-0.004]† [0.064] 
Cumulative -0.013 -0.007 -0.005 0.497 
  [-0.007] [-0.005] [-0.003] [0.127] 
 
†p < .10,   *p < .05,   **p < .01,   ***p < .001 
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Table 5 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Asset Divestiture, 2009-2012 
This table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of a firm undertaking asset divestiture. All data are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The robust standard error was estimated using the cluster option in 
STATA. All covariates are lagged by one year. Industry and year dummies were included in all models.  
 
          
  
Dependent variable: Asset Divestiture 
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
VARIABLES Baseline     Full Model 
     Hedge fund investment  
 
1.636 
 
1.220 
  
(1.049) 
 
(0.878) 
CEO equity-based incentives  
  
0.023* 0.020* 
   
(0.011) (0.010) 
Ownership concentration -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Other foreign investors -0.521 -0.478 -0.452 -0.426 
 
(0.892) (0.895) (0.882) (0.887) 
American deposit receipt 0.836+ 0.807+ 0.767+ 0.744 
 
(0.453) (0.448) (0.454) (0.453) 
CEO tenure 0.041 0.043 0.036 0.039 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Diversification -0.216 -0.180 -0.481 -0.437 
 
(0.754) (0.763) (0.811) (0.811) 
ROA -4.860+ -5.376+ -5.774* -6.036* 
 
(2.776) (2.845) (2.904) (2.950) 
Sales growth 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Stock performance -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage ratio 1.284 1.313 1.756 1.697 
 
(1.573) (1.562) (1.413) (1.425) 
Log(total assets) 0.549** 0.593** 0.478** 0.519** 
 
(0.162) (0.154) (0.170) (0.161) 
Constant -11.854** -12.644** -10.616** -11.331** 
 
(3.457) (3.309) (3.527) (3.389) 
     Log-likelihood -87.82 -87.14 -86.18 -85.81 
No. firm-year observations 407 407 407 407 
No. firms 107 107 107 107 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
    ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 6 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Employee Layoffs, 2009-2012 
This table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of a firm undertaking employee layoffs. All data 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The robust standard error was estimated using the cluster option in 
STATA. All covariates are lagged by one year. Industry and year dummies were included in all models. 
 
        
  
Dependent variable: Employee Layoffs 
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
VARIABLES Baseline     Full Model 
     Hedge fund investment  
 
-0.052 
 
0.027 
  
(0.850) 
 
(0.884) 
CEO equity-based incentives  
  
-0.008 -0.009 
   
(0.015) (0.015) 
Ownership concentration 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Other foreign investors -0.608 -0.610 -0.631 -0.630 
 
(0.469) (0.474) (0.471) (0.475) 
American deposit receipt 0.387 0.388 0.408 0.408 
 
(0.419) (0.419) (0.416) (0.415) 
CEO tenure -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Diversification -0.462 -0.466 -0.447 -0.445 
 
(0.599) (0.601) (0.604) (0.609) 
ROA -4.092* -4.085* -3.936* -3.939* 
 
(1.975) (1.957) (1.988) (1.974) 
Sales growth -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Stock performance -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Leverage ratio 3.815** 3.817** 3.783** 3.782** 
 
(1.137) (1.145) (1.137) (1.145) 
Log(total assets) -0.054 -0.055 -0.038 -0.038 
 
(0.145) (0.147) (0.156) (0.160) 
Constant -2.790 -2.774 -3.002 -3.011 
 
(3.050) (3.072) (3.211) (3.256) 
Log-likelihood -153.1 -153.1 -152.9 -152.9 
No. firm-year observations 407 407 407 407 
No. firms 107 107 107 107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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